Buffalo Law Review
Volume 2

Number 2

Article 19

4-1-1953

Literary Property—Elements of Ownership of an Idea
Robert Louis Manuele

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.buffalo.edu/buffalolawreview
Part of the Intellectual Property Law Commons

Recommended Citation
Robert L. Manuele, Literary Property—Elements of Ownership of an Idea, 2 Buff. L. Rev. 331 (1953).
Available at: https://digitalcommons.law.buffalo.edu/buffalolawreview/vol2/iss2/19

This Recent Decision is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at Digital Commons @
University at Buffalo School of Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in Buffalo Law Review by an authorized
editor of Digital Commons @ University at Buffalo School of Law. For more information, please contact
lawscholar@buffalo.edu.

REGENT DECISIONS
The defense of a violation of the constitutional right against
unreasonable searches and seizures is equally untenable in both the
Rochis case, supra, and in the instant case. The evidence obtained
thereby is not necessarily inadmissible in the state courts. Wolf
v. Colorado, 338 U. S. 25 (1949). California admits evidence
obtained by an illegal search and seizure. People v. Gonzales, 20
Cal. 2d 165, 124 P. 2d 44 (1942).
Apparently, neither the privilege against self-incrimination
nor the protection against unreasonable search and seizure is the
"principle" of the Rochin case, within which the instant case is
said to fall. In the Rochin case, the court referred to the stomach
pumping as "conduct that shocks the conscience," as a procedure
"bound to offend even hardened sensibilities," as acts which
"offend the community's sense of fair play," and as "brutal conduct." Thus it appears that in that case Frankfurter, J., disapproved primarily of the violence and the force used, the emphasis
being on the method and not the evidence obtained thereby.
The writer of the annotation at 25 A. L. R. 2d 1407 (1952) suggests that the aim of the decision is to strike at illegal police, rather
than court, practice. Coerced confessions are prohibited by the
due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment in both federal
and state couits on like grounds; the police, to convict a man, cannot extract by force what is in his mind. Watts v. Indiana, 338
U. S. 49 (1949) ; Malinski v. New York, 324 U. S. 401 (1945). The
Rochin case apparently applies this principle to prohibit the use of
evidence obtained by exacting by force what is in his stomach.
The element of force is conspicuously lacking in the instant
case. Moreover, since the defendant was in need of a blood transfusion, even if the law enforcement authorities had not wanted a
blood sample, she would have undergone exactly the same treatment. It is submitted that the taking of blood under these circumstances does not come within the rule of Rochin v. California,
supra, and is nota violation of due process.

Paul Gonsonr
LITERARY PROPERTY-ELEMENTS OF
OWNERSHIP OF AN IDEA
Plaintiff, engaged in the advertising business, conceived an
idea for a radio program. He outlined it to defendant, indicating
that he expected compensation if the idea were used. Later, defendant put the program on the radio via another advertising
agency. Alleging his ownership of the idea, plaintiff sued to re-
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cover for its use. Held: Judgment for plaintiff. Whether the
idea was original and whether it had been reduced to a form sufficiently definite and concrete were questions for the jury. Belt v.
Hamilton National Bank, 108 F. Supp. 689 (D. C. 1952).
There may be property rights in an idea which the courts will
protect. Stanley v. Columbia BroadcastingSystem, 35 Cal. 2d 653,
221 P. 2d 73 (1950); William A. Meier Glass Co. v.Anchor Hocking Glass Corp., 95 F. Supp. 264 (W. D. Pa. 1951); Ketcham v.
New York World's Fair1939, Inc., 34 F. Supp. 657 (E. D. N. Y.
1940). These rights may not be protected under copyright laws,
which look not so much to the idea as to the originality of its expression. Baker v. Selden, 101 U. S. 99 (1879); Seltzer v. Snbrock, 22 F. Supp. 621 (S. D. Cal. 1938). Similarly, these ideas
are not necessarily protected by patent laws, which protect "any
new and useful art, machine, manufacture or composition of matter." iREv. STAT. § 4886 (1875), 35 U.S.C. § 31 (1946). See Fowler
v. City of New York, 121 Fed. 747 (2d Cir. 1903). An idea is not
an "art." Hotel Security Checking Co. v. Lorraine Co., 160 Fed.
467 (2d Cir. 1908).
' An idea, to be protected, must be novel. Lueddecke v. Chevrolet Motor Co., 70 F. 2d 245 (8th Cir. 1934). The question of the
novelty of the idea is ordinarily for the jury. Ketcham v. New
York World's Fair1939, Inc., supra.
The idea must be reduced to a concrete form. Thomas v. R. J.
Reynolds Tobacco Co., 350 Pa. 262, 38 A. 2d 61 (1944). While concreteness was found in Stanley v. Columbia BroadcastingSystem,
supra,where plaintiff had prepared a script, recording, and format
of a sample program, it was found lacking in O'Brien v. RKO
Radio Pictures, 68 F. Supp. 13 (S.D. N. Y. 1946), noted, 20 So.
CAL. L. REv. 371 (1947), where four brief suggestions for story
treatment of a movie were submitted. See also, Bowen v. Yankee
Network, Inc., 46 F. Supp. 62 (Mass. 1942). Ideas for advertisements were held sufficiently concrete in Liggett & Myers Tobacco
Co. v. Meyers, 101 Ind. App. 194 N. E. 206 (1935), where the
idea was to picture two gentlemen, one saying, "Have one of
these," and the other replying, "No, thanks; I smoke Chesterfields," and in Ryan & Associates, Inc. v. Century Brewing Ass'n,
185 Wash. 600, 55 P. 2d 1055 (1936), which involved an advertising slogan: "The Beer of the Century." However, concreteness
was lacking where only a "scrip" was submitted to an advertising
agency. Stone v. Liggett & Myers Tobacco Co., 260 App. Div. 450,
23 N. Y. S. 2d 210 (1st Dep't 1940).
As in the case of a common law copyright, an idea may meet
the requirements of novelty and concreteness, but upon its publi-

RECENT DECISIONS
cation to the public the originator loses all his rights of ownership.
F. W. Dodge Corp. v. Comstock, 140 Mlisc. 105, 251 N. Y. Supp. 172
(Sup. Ct. 1931); American Tobacco Co. v. Werkmeister, 207 U. S.
264 (1907). The courts have confined their definition of what is

publication.

The compilation of information for distribution to

subscribers under an agreement not to divulge the information is

no publication. F. W. Dodge Corp. v. Comstock, supra. Exhibition of an artist's picture in a gallery where no one was permitted
to copy it was held no publication, American Tobacco Co. v. Werkmeister, supra; nor was the disclosure of a new "loop" design for
glassware made in a demonstration of a new method of fire polishing. William A. Meier Glass Co. v. Anchor Hocking Glass Corp.,
supra. It has also been held that if an idea cannot be sold, negotiated, or used without disclosure, a contract must regulate such
disclosure or the idea becomes the acquisition of whoever receives
it. Young v. Ralston-Purina Co., 88 F. 2d 97 (8th Cir. 1937).
This seems almost prohibitory of disclosure without a contract.
There are three theories upon which recovery has been granted. One who uses another's idea which is entitled to protection is
said to have been unjustly enriched. Matarese v. Moore-McCormack Lines, Inc., 158 F. 2d 170 (2d Cir. 1946). Another theory of
recovery is an implied agreement that the person to whom the
idea is disclosed will not use it for his own benefit. Gilbert v. General Motors Corp., Inc., 41 F. Supp. 525 (W. D. N. Y. 1941), aff'd,
133 F. 2d 997 (2d Cir. 1941), cert. denied, 319 U. S. 743 (1943).
Where there is no contractual relationship implied, the courts
have proceeded on a theory of confidential disclosure. Hoeltke v.
C. M. Kemp Mfg. Co., 80 F. 2d 912 (4th Cir. 1935), cert. denied, 298
U. S. 673 (1936); Becker v. Contours Laboratories,279 U. S. 388
(1928). Fundamental to recovery upon any ground is that remuneration be expected when the idea is disclosed. Liggett &'Myers
Tobacco Co. v. Meyers, supra; Lueddecke v. Chevrolet Motor Co.,
supra.
Since some business ideas which have met the requirements
of novelty and concreteness have great monetary value, the originator of the idea should be protected against its unauthorized
exploitation. This is merely the same type of protection given
both to common law copyrights and presently to trade secrets. A.
0. Smith Corp. v. PetroleumIron Works Co. of Ohio, 73 F. 2d 531
(6th Cir. 1934).
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